Obtaining Waiver for Nonimmigrants

Nonimmigrants who are found ineligible for admission (inadmissible) for entry into the U.S. are permanently barred from entering or remaining in the U.S. Generally, an inadmissible individual can seek entrance on a temporary basis with an Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §212(d)(3) nonimmigrant visa waiver. This waiver is available to foreign nationals who have been found inadmissible due to various reasons, including criminal convictions, medical grounds, and immigration violations. Eligible applicants can find the waiver useful if they can overcome the grounds of inadmissibility as listed in the INA (exceptions are related to foreign policy and association with Nazi persecutions).

Normally, the waiver is accompanied by a nonimmigrant visa (e.g. H-1B, L1, tourist visa, or student visa). An individual needing a nonimmigrant waiver will file the waiver request at the time of applying for a nonimmigrant visa at an U.S. embassy or consulate. If the consular officer supports the approval of the waiver, s/he would submit his/her recommendation along with the waiver request to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Admissibility Review Office (ARO). The ARO reviews the waiver recommendation and submits a response to the consular post.

If the consular officer does not recommend an applicant for a waiver, the applicant can still proceed with the submission and request the consular officer to forward the waiver application. The consular officer will submit the waiver along with his/her case summary to U.S. Department of State (DOS) Visa Office (VO). If the VO determines that the waiver should be granted, it will forward the waiver request to ARO for final adjudication.  It is noteworthy to remember that the consular officer may submit a recommendation to DOS against the waiver with a summary of reasons for the objection to a favorable grant of waiver.

If a nonimmigrant visa has been obtained or is not required, then the waiver can be applied at a U.S. port of entry. For waivers submitted directly to CBP, instead of submission through a consulate, Form I-192 Application for Advance Permission to Enter as a Nonimmigrant has to be completed. For cases involving U visas or T visas, the waiver can be applied through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

It is at the immigration officers’ discretion to grant or deny the waiver application. However, there are three main factors that the officers will consider: (1) the risk of harm to society in admitting the applicant; (2) the seriousness of the acts that caused the inadmissibility; and (3) the importance of the applicant’s reason for seeking entry.  

Current processing times for waivers filed with a U.S. consulate is up to 90 to 180 days. For waivers submitted directly to the CBP, processing times can be up to 150 to 180 days. Please note that the processing times are estimates and actual processing times may vary depending on an individual’s case and/or ARO’s caseload.

Waivers are useful and an important solution for many individuals who are found inadmissible. However, filing the waiver application does not mean the waiver request will be granted; it is a complex, lengthy, and discretionary process. Feel free to contact our office to learn more about eligibility and submitting a §212(d)(3) nonimmigrant visa waiver.

Warrantless Searches by CBP at the Border and Port of Entry

U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents have the broad legal authority to conduct searches at the border and Port of Entry (POE). Unlike police officers who need search warrants, CBP can conduct searches “without individualized suspicion” as stated in CBP’s policy. U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and visitors alike are subjected to CBP searches, including searches of electronic devices and social media accounts.

In light of heightened national security interests and border protection, the Supreme Court has upheld CBP’s right to conduct warrantless searches without any suspicion as “reasonable” and an exception to the 4th Amendment. In this digital age where cell phones, laptops, and other electronic devices, contain private information, including photos, contacts, and messages, the warrantless search is rather intrusive, particuarly when it is done without much justification by the CBP agent.

A secondary issue to the warrantless searches is CBP’s access to the individual’s social media accounts. CBP started collecting identifiers (search words) to view one’s public information in 2016. However, American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) reported that it has seen instances where CBP agents requested login information so they can view private messages. Homeland Security Secretary John F. Kelly said officials were considering a policy that would allow CBP agents to ask refugees and immigrants for their social media login information. 

Speaking to The New York Times, a CBP spokesman reported that CBP agents inspected 4,444 cellphones and 320 other electronic devices in 2015. The number rose to 23,000 in 2016. America Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reported that it has seen an increase in the number of people who said their electronic devices have been searched.

One can refuse to consent to a search, but that does not stop CBP from forcing him/her to unlock the device, detain him/her until s/he consents, arrest the him/her, seize the device and release the person, or for nonimmigrants, refuse their admission into the U.S. There are ways to prepare before traveling. Suggestions from ACLU include:

  • traveling with as little data and as few devices as possible. The less you’re carrying, the less there is to search. Consider using a travel-only smartphone or laptop that doesn’t contain private or sensitive information. You could also ship your devices to yourself in advance. (Be aware that CBP claims the authority to search international packages so it is best to encrypt any devices that you ship.) Keep in mind that a forensic search of your device will unearth deleted items, metadata, and other files.  
  • encrypting devices with strong and unique passwordsand shut them down when crossing the border.  
  • storing sensitive data in a secure cloud-storage account. Don’t keep a copy of the data in your physical possession, and disable any apps that connect to cloud-based accounts where you store sensitive communications or files. (There’s no articulated CBP policy on whether agents may click on apps and search data stored in the cloud. While this kind of warrantless search should be well outside the government’s authority at the border, we don’t know how they view this issue.)  
  • uploading sensitive photos on your camera to your password-protected laptop or a cloud-storage account. Digital cameras don’t offer encrypted storage, so you should consider backing up your photos and deleting them from your camera and reformatting the camera’s memory card.

BIA Appeal Reverses Material Misrepresentation on I-485

From time to time, like in our previous writing, Abandonment of LPR (Green Card) Status (Part II), we discuss unpublished/non-precedential decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) made public thru various means. While non-precedential decisions are only binding on the parties to the case – they are nevertheless very instructive because the BIA is the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws.

Another such non-precedential decision is the case Muhamad Yusuf Luwaga, A097 750 414 (BIA Dec. 12, 2014), wherein the BIA addressed the issue of whether a false signature on a Form I-485 application for adjustment of status constituted a willful misrepresentation of material fact. By statute, Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) renders inadmissible any foreign national seeking to procure a benefit  under the INA through fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact.

In Luwaga, the BIA considered an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) ruling that the respondent (Luwaga) willfully misrepresented a material fact on his adjustment of status Form I-485 application by testifying, under oath, that the signature on the application was his when, in reality, it was not. Ultimately, the IJ declared Luwaga inadmissible because there was no properly sworn Form I-485 before the court.

In sustaining Luwaga’s appeal, the BIA stated the general test for assessing whether a misrepresentation is material as “whether the respondent potentially would be inadmissible or ineligible for relief under the true facts, or whether the misrepresentation would tend to cut off a line of inquiry relevant to the respondent’s eligibility for admission or relief.”  

The BIA applied this test and initially conceded as “obvious” the IJ would have inquired further had Luwaga truthfully admitted his signature did not appear on the application.

However, the BIA gave more weight to the fact no finding was made (by the IJ) that the substantive information in the application itself was false or misleading. Furthermore, the BIA found especially significant Luwaga had previously established prejudice due to ineffective assistance of his prior attorney which may have contributed to his false testimony.

Accordingly, in the absence of a finding of material misrepresentation as to substantive content, the BIA determined the identity of the signer on Luwaga’s original Form I-485 not relevant to his admissibility or eligibility for other relief, particularly in the context of a substantiated claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.      

Happily, it appears substance prevailed over form in this BIA ruling. Sharma Law Offices, a highly rated Atlanta immigration law firm, is available for consultation with respect to adjustment of status issues.     

U.S. Supreme Court Decision Broadens Rights Afforded to Same-Sex Couples

In our past news item, DOMA Ruling and Immigration Benefits for Same-Sex Partners, we discussed the implications of a June 2013 Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) decision invalidating an  operative provision of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) affecting same-sex marriages.

More specifically, in U.S. v. Windsor, the SCOTUS struck down Section 3 of the DOMA as unconstitutional. Section 3 of DOMA prohibited the federal government from recognizing same-sex married couples as married for federal purposes.

Prior to U.S. v. Windsor, DOMA, Section 3, had far reaching consequences because many federal laws addressed or hinged upon marital or spousal status.

With respect to federal immigration law, under DOMA, same-sex partners were disallowed immigration benefits conditioned upon the existence of a marriage or spousal status. For example, persons in same-sex unions were excluded from the same immigration benefits obtainable by persons in opposite-sex marriages such as those related to family-based visas, employment-based visas, refugee status, asylum, naturalization, and discretionary waivers.

After Windsor struck down DOMA’s confinement of marriage to heterosexual couples, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) began to recognize same-sex marriages for immigration purposes. In this regard, USCIS issued a series of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) specifying how the Windsor decision implicated certain immigration based benefits contingent on marital or spousal status.

In one key FAQ, USCIS concluded the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated determines whether the marriage is legally valid for immigration purposes. Therefore, under this “State of Celebration” FAQ, same-sex couples living in a state that did not recognize same-sex marriage could still apply for federal immigration benefits as long as they were validly married in another state that recognized same-sex marriage.

Notably, but for the 2013 SCOTUS Windsor decision, more recent spousal immigration benefits related to the ability to study and work in the U.S. and  discussed in our news items DHS Permits Part-Time F-2 and M-2 Study and Removes DSO Cap and H-4 EAD for Certain Dependent Spouses Now in Effect, would not have applied to persons in same-sex marriages under the pre-Windsor Defense of Marriage Act.

On June 26, 2015, as the title to the present article suggests, the SCOTUS issued another decision in Obergefell v. Hodges which effectively broadens the scope of the Windsor decision.

Whereas Windsor invalidated a provision of a federal law (DOMA), Obergefell addresses the more global issue of whether individual states are permitted to limit the definition of marriage to the union between one man and one woman.

In Obergefell, the SCOTUS found the right to marry is a fundamental liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that exists between two people of the same sex. In doing so, Obergefell now requires all 50 states to license same-sex marriages and to recognize same-sex marriages legally performed out of state.

Accordingly, de facto expansion of the above mentioned “State of Celebration” FAQ is one result of the Obergefell decision because pre-Obergefell variation in state law as to the validity of same-sex marriage is no longer an impediment to immigration benefits conferred under federal law.

Over the years, Sharma Law Offices, a top rated Atlanta Immigration Lawyer, has handled thousands of marriage-based and employment-based petitions and is proud to work on behalf of individuals and businesses seeking same-sex immigration benefits.

U.S. Supreme Court Solidifies the Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability

On June 15, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision in Kerry v. Din which reinforces the viability of the judicially created doctrine known as “consular nonreviewability.”

At its broadest, the doctrine of consular nonreviewability is typically understood to mean a consular officer’s decision to deny a visa is not subject to judicial review and scrutiny regarding the underlying bases for such denial. As a narrow exception, the government need only supply a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for denying a visa when the denial affects the rights of a U.S. citizen. The end result is an applicant is often bereft of meaningful recourse to test the validity of and/or overcome a consular officer’s decision to deny his or her visa.

The doctrine evolved from case law more or less beginning in the late 1800s at a time when anti-immigration sentiment ran high. The decisions in this line of cases generally found U.S. courts should not interfere with determinations whether to allow foreign nationals into the U.S. because such matters are sovereign and political in nature and rest exclusively within the province of congress. This is sometimes also referred to as “plenary power” of congress to exclude foreign nationals the privilege to enter the United States. 

Under the facts of Kerry v. Din, the foreign national, Kanishka Berashk, a citizen of Afghanistan, is married to Fauzia Din, a naturalized U.S. citizen. Berashk also held a civil servant position (payroll clerk) with the Afghanistan government during a time when the Afghan government was controlled by the Taliban.

Din filed and obtained approval of an I-130 petition for her husband “as an immediate relative” so they could be together as husband and wife in the United States. However, after a prolonged waiting period, the consular officer denied Berashk a visa – vaguely citing an INA provision prohibiting admission of individuals engaged in “terrorist activities.” The denial offered no explanation specifying what terrorist activities Berashk engaged in or what Berashk had otherwise done that led to denial of his visa. One can speculate Berashk’s civil servant position under a Taliban controlled government played some part in the denial.   

Din thereafter filed a lawsuit in U.S. district court seeking relief in the form of an extraordinary writ instructing the government to properly adjudicate Berashk’s visa application and provide notice as to the facts upon which the government relied to deny her husband’s visa. The U.S. district court dismissed Din’s claim under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. Upon Din’s appeal, the U.S. circuit court disagreed with the district court and found the government’s mere citation to an INA statute in the absence of supporting factual allegations was not a facially valid reason to deny Berashk’s visa application.  

The government thereafter appealed the circuit court’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Unfortunately for Din and her husband, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court decision and found Din, as a naturalized U.S. citizen, did not have a right to a more detailed explanation than the “facially legitimate and bona fide” citation to the federal INA statute related to terrorist activities, and, ultimately, Din did not have a due process right for judicial review of the consular officer’s denial.

The importance of carefully crafting visa applications at consulates abroad in the first instance is crucial, especially in light of the continued viability of the doctrine of consular nonreviewability rendering it very difficult to upset a consular officer’s decision to deny a visa. Therefore, it is recommended one contact an experienced immigration attorney to consult on such matters, particularly when there may only be one bite at the apple.

Abandonment of LPR (Green Card) Status (Part II)

In Part I, we touched upon principles and concerns surrounding the issue of abandonment as it generally relates to travel abroad and maintaining Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) or “Green Card” status.

Here, in Part II, we will briefly examine an unpublished Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in Saleh Mohammed Otaifah, A055 775 988 (BIA Jan. 26, 2015) as an example of how some of the principles discussed in Part I were applied by an Immigration Judge (IJ) and by the BIA to an interesting set of facts.

Under the facts of the decision, the LPR, Otaifah, is a native citizen of Yemen. Otaifah married and came to the U.S. based on derivative status to his wife – a child of a U.S. citizen.

Otaifah, unable to initially find work in the U.S., returned to Yemen, then came back to the U.S. where he found work for a period of time. However, Otaifah quit his U.S. job and returned to Yemen in July 2003. It was during this last trip to Yemen that Otaifah was arrested and jailed in 2004. 

Otaifah was subsequently acquitted of the charges in Yemen and released from jail. Sometime after his release, Otaifah returned to the U.S. in December 2010. Removal proceedings were thus initiated based on Otaifah’s extended absence (July 2003 – December 2010) from the United States.

At issue before the IJ during the removal hearing was whether Otaifah “intended to abandon his status or … his intent to actually reside in the United States” by virtue of his time abroad in Yemen viewed in light of other evidence regarding Otaifah’s comparative ties to the U.S. and Yemen. The IJ noted since Otaifah was in Yemen for over a year; “The Government is aided by the statutory presumption of abandonment of status by departure for more than one year.”

The IJ found Otaifah was arrested in 2004 and was freed from incarceration around September 2007. The IJ recognized the arrest and jailing for the period between 2004 and 2007 as an unforeseen event excusing Otaifah’s absence for this portion of his last stay in Yemen.

During the removal proceeding, Otaifah testified when he last departed for Yemen in July 2003, he intended to stay 7-8 months, then return. He maintained his failure to return was the result of being taken into custody in 2004 and so precluded from entering the U.S. until his release in December 2010. Therefore, a discrepancy in the evidence existed as to whether Otaifah was released in 2007 versus 2010. 

Nevertheless, the IJ decided Otaifah was freed from incarceration in 2007 and able to return to the U.S. during the period from September 2007 and December 2010. The IJ considered the multiple years between 2007 and 2010 an unexplained absence because Otaifah was free and able to return to the U.S., but did not do so.

Based on his finding, the IJ treated Otaifah’s unexplained absence from 2007 to 2010 as “a permanent resident status adopted but then abandoned by departure for an unexplained, lengthy period of time, well more than a year” and held Otaifah “in fact abandoned his lawful permanent resident status in the United States.” 

In so finding, the IJ considered evidence of Otaifah’s ties to the U.S. during the relevant time period(s) as indicia of his intent (or lack thereof) to maintain permanent residence in the U.S. including: Otaifah did not have a U.S. bank account; he had not paid U.S. taxes; he was estranged from his wife; Otaifah had a child who remained in Yemen; Otaifah was not close to his father-in- law; and, Otaifah had no property in the U.S., but property, a store, work, and land in Yemen. 

The IJ found relevant Otaifah’s first two stays in the U. S. were short (2-3 months). Otaifah was unable to find work during the first stay, and during the second – he found work but apparently quit after a short period of time. The IJ further noted Otaifah last flew to Yemen with no return air ticket to the United States.

The IJ was especially concerned Otaifah “came to the United States, left, came to the United States and left, he never appeared to have fully established himself in the United States; rather, it appeared that he was visiting the United States and returning to a domicile in Yemen.”

Consequently, the IJ ordered Otaifah’s removal to Yemen.  

Otaifah thereafter appealed the IJ’s order. On appeal, the BIA narrowly focused on the evidentiary inconsistency regarding Otaifah’s release date. Specifically, the IJ based his finding Otaifah was released in September 2007 on a prison release form dated 09/07, yet in the body of the form it states he was released in 2010.

Since Otaifah claimed he was released in 2010 – the BIA held the government (despite the presumption of abandonment) did not meet its burden to establish Otaifah, who was in Yemen between 2003 and 2010, intended to abandon his status as a lawful permanent resident. The BIA remanded for clarification as to the actual date on which Otaifah was released from prison in Yemen and thereby free to return to the United States.         

As discussed in Part I, the government must prove intent to abandon LPR status in the United States. The above case illustrates the interplay between factors relevant to finding intent including the length of time and frequency one spends abroad, the nature of those visits, the presumption of abandonment for absences in excess of a year, the importance of documentary evidence demonstrating strong and fixed ties to the U.S., and the importance of accurately documenting the temporary purpose of the trip abroad, or how an unexpected occurrence impeded return within a year. 

Sharma Law Offices, a highly rated immigration law firm, remains available to consult on matters affecting travel and status

Abandonment of LPR (Green Card) Status (Part I)

Maintaining Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) status requires intent to permanently reside in the United States. Accordingly, an LPR is subject to a removal order from an Immigration Judge if found to have “abandoned” intent to live in the U.S. permanently.

The issue of abandonment often arises when an LPR travels abroad. Although the LPR’s intent is controlling – the length of time and frequency one spends abroad are factors weighed by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to readmit LPRs at the port of entry, and by Immigration Judges to determine whether the LPR abandoned intent to maintain permanent residence in the United States.     

As to length of time, absences in excess of 6 months may give rise to a presumption of   abandonment. Absences from the U.S. for a year or more are likely to face the greatest amount of scrutiny because, for one, the Permanent Resident Card or “green card” becomes technically invalid if the LPR is abroad for over a year. In these instances, the LPR may face a greater burden to overcome the presumption of abandonment than for those staying abroad for less protracted timeframes.

As to frequency, a LPR’s intent to maintain permanent residency may come into question if, for example, the individual lives abroad and routinely returns to the U.S. once every 5 months. Without more, an Immigration Judge may very well consider such person to have abandoned LPR status despite keeping stays outside the U.S. under 6 months.

There are certainly legitimate reasons for LPRs to remain abroad for long periods of time. To care for infirm or elderly relatives is one example. In such instances, presenting evidence to CBP at the port of entry demonstrating strong and fixed ties to the U.S. is important indicia of intent to maintain permanent residence and that the stay abroad was indeed for a temporary purpose.

Such evidence may include filing of income tax returns, family members in the U.S., property ownership, bank accounts, insurance, U.S. Driver’s license, and business affiliations. Things like returning to the U.S. on a one way ticket versus a round trip ticket may also be considered.

In addition, obtaining a reentry permit (valid for 2 years) if one knows ahead of time the stay abroad will exceed a year, or applying at a U.S. Consulate abroad for a SB-1 Returning Resident Visa in instances where the LPR is kept away longer than a year due to unforeseen circumstances, are potential preemptive options to consider. In either case, the LPR should be prepared to document the reasons for leaving the U.S., the temporary nature for the stay abroad, and the cause for not returning within a year.

As often the case, travel abroad raises many issues to consider. Having a plan in place to avoid unintentionally abandoning LPR status deserves consideration. Sharma Law Offices, a highly rated Atlanta immigration law firm, is experienced in these matters and is available for a consultation.

In Part II, we will discuss the unpublished Board of Immigration Appeals decision in Saleh Mohammed Otaifah, A055 775 988 (BIA Jan. 26, 2015) which is an example of how some of the principles discussed herein were applied by an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals.

What Is a Public Charge?

Determination that a person is a “public charge,” under U.S. immigration law has been used as grounds for inadmissibility and deportation of immigrants for many years, although deportations on public charge grounds are very rare because the standards are very strict. U.S. immigration officials use the term “public charge” in reference to a person who is considered primarily dependent on the government for assistance, specifically cash assistance in order to maintain an income or provide for institutionalization for long-term care.

Although an individual who is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible to the United States and ineligible to become a legal permanent resident, receiving public benefits does not automatically make an individual a public charge.

The following is a list of cash assistance for income maintenance, which can be considered by immigration officials, and disqualify an immigrant, when determining whether an immigrant will be a public charge:

  • Supplemental Security Income;
  • Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF);
  • State and local cash benefit programs that are for the purpose of income maintenance (often called “General Assistance” but which may exist under other names);
  • Long-term care benefits under Medicaid.

However, there are several other program which provide various assistance, and are not considered as a cash benefit for income maintenance purposes, such as:

  • All government health center programs;
  • Educational benefits (including Head Start);
  • Prenatal care;
  • Food Stamps;
  • WIC;
  • Child care assistance;
  • Energy assistance, such as the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP);
  • Job training programs.

Eligible non-citizens can use all of the services listed above without fear that use of these services will be considered evidence of public charge status. It should also be noted that the totality of the circumstances are taken into account when the USCIS is deciding whether an immigrant is likely to become a public charge. These factors may include the alien’s age, health, family status, assets, financial status, resources, education and skills. No single factor will disqualify an immigrant from becoming a lawful permanent residence, as discretion is used, but the longer an alien has received cash income-maintenance benefits in the past, as well as the greater the amount of benefits, the stronger the implication that the alien is likely to become a public charge.

DHS Permits Part-Time F-2 and M-2 Study and Removes DSO Cap

In our May 29, 2015 article H-4 EAD for Certain Dependent Spouses Now in Effect, we reported on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) new rule allowing certain H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B employees to apply for employment authorization. A stated purpose of the new H-4 EAD provision is to increase U.S. global competiveness for highly skilled workers through amelioration of disincentives, economic burdens, and personal stresses of H-1B employees and their families.

Effective May 29, 2015, the DHS also amended its regulations under the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) to expand opportunities for spouses and children of international students to engage in a course of study. Similar to the H-4 EAD provisions mentioned above, enhancing U.S. global competitiveness for the best and brightest international students (highly skilled workers in the case of the H-4 EAD) is a basis for the May 29, 2015 SEVP amendments.

Essentially, under prior regulations, F-2 and M-2 spouses of academic or vocational students with F-1 or M-1 status were prohibited from engaging in “full time” academic or vocational studies. F-2 and M-2 children could only engage in full time study if the study was in an elementary or secondary (K-12) school.

Now, per the amended SEVP regulation, F-2 and M-2 spouses and children can enroll in less than a “full course” of study in a SEVP certified school. Less than a full course of study is typically considered study less than the 12 credit hours defining a full time course load. Full time elementary and secondary study for F-2 and M-2 children is still allowed.

In addition, under the old rule, SEVP certified schools were permitted to nominate a maximum of 10 designated school officials (DSOs) to act as liaisons between the school and the SEVP in order to ensure compliance with laws regulating international students. Now, SEVP certified schools are allowed to nominate as many DSOs deemed necessary to adequately provide services such as recommendations, record keeping, and reporting with respect to F and/or M students enrolled at the school. Again, one reason for lifting the 10 DSO cap is increased flexibility ultimately resulting in enhanced attractiveness for international students to study in the United States.  

Sharma Law Offices, a highly rated Atlanta Immigration Law Firm, actively monitors rule amendments – like those discussed above – which potentially expand rights afforded under prior regulations. We are, of course, available for consultation regarding applicability to your particular set of circumstances.

Advance Parole Does not Trigger Unlawful Presence

Traveling abroad? The Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec.771 (BIA 2012) as an example of the interplay between travel and status.

In the landmark decision Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found a husband (Arrabally) and wife (Yerrabelly) – both of whom resided in the US for over a year after their respective temporary visas expired – could travel outside the US under a grant of “advance parole” without becoming inadmissible by operation of law. While this decision is several years old, well settled, and often cited by immigration lawyers, a brief synopsis of the underlying facts and rationale behind the decision may benefit as an example of issues arising from travel abroad.

Under the facts, Rao Arrabally and Sarala Yerrabelly entered the US as non-immigrants with temporary visas. The couple remained in the US for some years after their respective visas expired. The husband thereafter obtained an approved employment-based immigrant visa petition and the couple accordingly applied to the United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) for adjustment of status. However, during the pendency of the adjustment of status application, the couple needed to return to India to attend aging parents.

At issue is a federal statute stating a foreign national is barred from admissibility if he or she departs the US and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such departure if that person was unlawfully present in the US a year or more prior to departure. Here, Arrabally and Yerrabelly were “unlawfully” present in the US more than one year after their respective temporary visas expired. Of concern was whether USCIS would consider the pending adjustment application abandoned as a result of departing the United States. As a result, Arrabally and Yerrabelly applied for (and were granted) “advance parole” which is a travel dispensation typically sought by foreign nationals already inside the US desiring to leave temporarily but fear exclusion as inadmissible upon return.  

Despite the grant of advance parole, upon their return from India, the USCIS denied the couple’s adjustment of status application as ineligible because they departed the US and thereby became inadmissible by strict application of the 10 year bar. The USCIS’s decision to deny the adjustment of status application was later upheld by an immigration judge who further ordered the couple removed from the US as a result.

Fortunately, on appeal, the BIA did not agree with USCIS or the immigration judge.  The BIA rejected the government’s contention that leaving the US under advance parole still effectuates the type of departure that triggers the 10 year bar if unlawfully present for at least a year. In doing so, the BIA reasoned travel under a grant of advance parole is different than a regular departure since the individual is given an assurance he or she will generally be allowed back in the US and permitted to seek the benefit of a previously filed and pending adjustment of status application.

As the Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly decision illustrates, foreign travel can give rise to significant and, in some cases, counter intuitive consequences with respect to one’s immigration status in the United States.

Please feel free to contact Sharma Law Offices with questions regarding travel or other immigration matters with respect to your particular set of circumstances.